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Article
Cuban Migration to the United States in a PostNormalized Relations World
Kevin J. Fandl
Abstract
Relations between Cuba and the United States have ebbed
and flowed between outright hostility and friendship. Recently,
major steps have been taken by both countries to put the Cold War
past behind them and work toward a sustainable relationship for
the future. As economic and political relations between the two
neighbors improve, it is imperative that immigration policy be
part of the transitional process. Cubans have enjoyed special
immigration status for half a century, largely as a result of the
Cold War. The process of economic normalization must include a
normalization of immigration policy, phasing out the
unnecessary and unfair favoritism that is a vestige of a long-gone
era of our history.


Kevin J. Fandl, Ph.D. (George Mason University), J.D./M.A. (American
University), B.A. (Lock Haven University), is an Assistant Professor of Legal
Studies and Strategic Global Management at Temple University. He is also the
former Chief of Staff for International Trade and Intellectual Property at the
United States Department of Homeland Security’s International Intellectual
Property Rights Enforcement Center.

81

82

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although one cannot predict with certainty the reaction
of the United States government to the start of Cuba’s
democratic transition, its immigration policy towards
Cuba is unlikely to remain the same once the process gets
under way. For over three decades, the United States has
accepted hundreds of thousands of Cubans, bypassing
the standard rules for granting asylum or admitting
aliens as permanent residents. This preferential
treatment given to Cuban immigrants will almost
certainly cease with the end of communism in Cuba,
unless the political conditions on the island remain
unstable and warrant continuation of some program for
the handling of refugees . . . .Since the immigration
policy of this country is to provide uniform treatment to
aliens seeking admission, regardless of their country of
origin, Cuban nationals may well find themselves facing
the same barriers that citizens from other countries
presently experience in seeking to migrate to the United
States.1

These words were spoken by a Cuban attorney at a meeting
on the Cuban economy in 1998.2 The statement came three years
after Cuba had enacted a major foreign investment law
welcoming investments, even from Americans, to stimulate their
economy.3 It was also made two years after the Helms-Burton
Act passed the United States Congress, putting significant
economic and political pressure on Cuba through economic
sanctions tied to a democratic transition on the island.4 No
doubt, the tone at the end of the decade was one of hope through
action. And now, 18 years later we see that the hope was
squandered. But is there new hope today in the face of a
softening tone toward Cuba?

1. Matias F. Travieso-Díaz, Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in
a Post-Transition Cuba, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 234, 251 (1998).
2. Id.
3. See Kevin J. Fandl, Foreign Investment in Cuban Real Property: The
Case for American Investors, 45 REAL ESTATE L. J. 166, 180 (2016).
4. Andreas Lowenfield & Brice Clagett, Congress and Cuba: The HelmsBurton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 419 (1996).

2017]

CUBAN MIGRATION

83

The United States has a long history with its neighbor 90
miles south of Florida. And given its proximity, Cuba has been a
part of United States foreign policy, national security, and
migration since its independence from Spain in 1898.5 At that
moment, the United States was directly involved in the
establishment of a free Cuba under the auspices of the United
States government, similar to Puerto Rico but without
citizenship rights. Trade relations between the countries were
strong through the first half of the twentieth century, with Cuba
exporting sugar and other agricultural products and the United
States exporting essential commodities.6
The relationship between the United States and Cuba
dramatically changed following the coup d’état by Fidel Castro
and the removal of Fulgencio Bautista from office. Castro
installed himself as a dictator and quickly aligned himself with
the communist movement led by the Soviet Union.7 What
unfolded after this turn of events was the rapid deterioration of
relations between the once friendly neighbors into proxy wars,
subversive interventions, and ultimately a nonviolent standoff.8
Today, as a new generation with little connection to the cold war
expresses their desire to bring Cuba back into the neighborhood
on positive terms, there is hope that the two countries will once
again engage with each other.9
The effects that the recent softening of United States-Cuba
relations will have on Cuban and American markets, which I
5. See generally Marc-William Palen, The Unequal US-Cuban Power
Relationship Stretches Back to the Turn of the 20th Century, HISTORYTODAY
(Dec. 21, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.historytoday.com/marc-william-palen/uscuba-embargo-goes-beyond-cold-war (describing United States-Cuba relations
throughout history, with particular emphasis on the rise of American
imperialism and economic nationalism vis-à-vis Cuba and other occupied
colonies following the Spanish-American War in 1898).
6. See generally Louis A. Perez Jr., As Cuba and the United States
Reengage: The Presence of the Past, ORIGINS: CURRENT EVENTS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, June 2015, at paras. 22, 29–47, https://origins.osu.edu/article
/cuba-and-united-states-reengage-presence-past
(describing
both
the
importance of Sugar to the Cuban economy in the late 19th Century and the
creation of a “free” Cuba).
7. See generally Alan H. Luxenberg, Did Eisenhower Push Castro into the
Arms of the Soviets?, 30 J. INT’L STUD. & WORLD AFF. 37, 42–45 (1988)
(discussing Castro’s rise to power and his allegiance to Communism).
8. See William Harvey Reeves, The Cuban Situation, 17 BUS. LAW. 980,
981, 986–88 (1962).
9. Spencer Parts, ‘Optimistic’ Cuban Youths Prepare to Welcome Obama,
MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 18, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news
/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article66980802.html.
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have discussed elsewhere,10 is uncertain but likely positive. And
the likelihood of more significant change in the near future is
also strong.11 What is less certain, however, is what will happen
to U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba. Cubans that fled the
island after Castro seized power were welcomed to the United
States as political refugees. They were afforded a special
immigration status that provided them with privileges that
other migrants did not (and do not) have. This special Cuban
migrant policy has been in place both as a way to provide refuge
from Cuban communism and also as a way to appease the
significant Cuban-American population in the United States, a
rare group of first generation immigrants with voting rights.12
In the face of normalizing economic and political relations
between the countries, the status of that special migration policy
is likely to come under fire.
In this paper, I will attempt to explain the dilemma that
policymakers will face when the following question arises: now
that relations with Cuba have been normalized, should Cuban
migrants be subjected to the same scrutiny as other migrants?
To do so, I will provide some background on the Cuban migration
story by discussing key events in Cuban history that drove
Cubans to leave the island in search of refuge in the United
States. Then, I will explain the corresponding United States
immigration laws affecting those Cuban migrants and how they
have changed over time. Finally, I will describe the impact that
normalized relations might have on Cuban migration by looking
at similar cases in other socialist countries.

10. See Fandl, supra note 3.
11. Kevin J. Fandl, Adios Embargo: The Case for Executive Termination of
the United States Embargo on Cuba, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 1, 43 (forthcoming 2017).
12. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 250–52 (noting that Cubans have
enjoyed special immigration rights in the past due to their flee from communism
and, in the future, legislators will have to take political ramifications into
account when proposing new immigration policy).
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II. THE CUBAN MIGRATION STORY
Following World War II, at a time when thousands of
individuals were displaced from their home countries due to war
and the rise of communism, the United States enacted the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948.13 That Act served as a precursor
to the refugee policy later adopted, but interestingly, it also
highlighted the preference of the United States government to
welcome people displaced by communism; it attempted to deal
with the refugee crisis produced by the war in Europe, but
“singled out those fleeing from communist or communistdominated countries as the most deserving for refugee status.”14
That Act exemplified the United States interest in providing a
home for those whose political ideals conflicted with the ideals
of communist regimes. This approach led the United States to
welcome and even to encourage political refugees from Soviet
republics, China, Cuba, and elsewhere, throughout the Cold
War.15 To better understand how the route from communism in
Cuba to capitalism in the United States developed for Cuban
migrants, we must start with the revolution.
Since its independence from Spain in 1898 and from the
United States in 1902, Cuba was led by a series of largely United
States-supported authoritarian leaders.16 Fidel Castro, who
disagreed with the corrupt and brutal leadership of Fulgencio
Batista, led a successful coup against the Cuban government in
1958.17 This alone did not break the relationship between the
United States and Cuba. It was a mixture of President
Eisenhower’s distaste for Castro and Cuba’s distaste for
American interference in their politics since 1898 that largely
led to the steps both governments took in subsequent years to
consolidate their positions. Without American support, Cuba
turned to the Soviets, who visited shortly after the revolution,
according to CIA documents.18
13. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1010 (1948).
14. Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The
Deception of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 253, 258 (1995).
15. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 239, 245 n.55.
16. See Fandl, supra note 3, at 166–67.
17. See, e.g., Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General
Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the ThirtyFive-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 901, 908
(1995).
18. Memorandum from Sherman Kent, Chairman, Office of Nat’l
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As part of its efforts to dispel support for the Castro regime,
the United States took steps to encourage Cuban defections,
especially of the elite and educated classes that might improve
the Cuban economy.19
A. FREEDOM FLIGHTS: THE CUBAN AIRLIFT IN NOVEMBER
1965 – APRIL 1973
On September 29, 1965, Fidel Castro declared that any
Cuban wanting to leave the island nation was free to do so.20 He
opened the Port of Camarioca and allowed Cubans wishing to
depart to do so after filing a form with the state relinquishing
title to all property in Cuba. Nearly 3,000 Cubans fled by boat
into the rough seas on their way to the United States. The
United States Coast Guard initiated a boatlift to rescue some of
those migrants and to bring them safely to the United States.21
President Johnson, reiterating the United States policy to
take in refugees fleeing communism, announced a few days later
that the United States would begin twice-daily flights to Havana
to bring those fleeing refugees to the United States.22 The
Johnson Administration estimated as many as 100,000 Cuban
refugees arriving during the airlift.23 These flights became
known as “freedom flights” and brought a mass surge of Cuban
migrants to the United States.24
American foreign policy at the time clearly favored support
of Cuban migration from the Castro regime.25 What was less
clear was how United States immigration policy, which at the
time was based on the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act,
would manage the large influx of Cuban arrivals.
To manage the surge of Cuban migrants fleeing Castro’s
Cuba in the mid-1960s, Congress enacted the Cuban Adjustment
Estimates, to the Director of the CIA 6 (Feb. 21, 1961),
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000132656.pdf.
19. See Bockley, supra note 14, at 262.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., The “Other” Boatlift: Camarioca, Cuba, 1965, U.S. COAST
GUARD,
https://www.uscg.mil/history/uscghist/camarioca1965.asp
(last
updated Sept. 15 2015).
22. Robert Young, Begin Miami Flights for Refugees Dec. 1, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
7, 1965, at 1 (explaining that as many as 4,000 Cuban refugees monthly were
expected during the airlift).
23. Id.
24. Joyce A. Hughes, Flight From Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 53 (1999).
25. Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 239.
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Act of 1966 (“Cuban Adjustment Act”).26 This Act effectively
turned Cuban migrants into a specially-protected class of
migrants fleeing communism at the height of the Cold War. The
Act put in place procedures allowing arriving Cubans as well as
many Cubans already present in the United States to adjust to
permanent resident status—the first step toward citizenship—
after only one year of presence, regardless of how the individual
arrived in the United States. The Cuban Adjustment Act, which
will be discussed in more detail later, paved the way to surging
demand by Cubans to make their way to the United States.
Cuban immigrants arriving in the United States prior to
1980 were largely white, upper-class, educated elites who had
property in Cuba that Castro either seized or devalued through
his socialist policies.27 These Cuban migrants, who quickly
became United States citizens in most cases, were active in
politics and in pushing for United States actions against the
Castro regime.28 These immigrants differed greatly from the
subsequent migrants, which included large numbers of working
class, apolitical or pro-Castro Cubans fleeing dire economic
circumstances similar to those in nearby Haiti or the Dominican
Republic.29 Yet, with the open door policy of the United States,
they had a viable exit strategy.
B. THE 1980S NEW WAVE POLICY: SAY HELLO TO THE
MARIELITOS30
President Carter gave a significant speech on political
refugees in 1980 in which he stated, “[The United States] would
continue to provide an open heart and open arms to refugees
seeking freedom from Communist domination and from
economic deprivation brought about primarily by Fidel Castro
and his government.”31 This became known as the “open arms”
26. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966).
27. John Grogan, Early Cuban Refugees in Miami were Model of Success,
FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Aug. 21, 1994), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1994-0821/features/9408190495_1_cuban-arrivals-cuban-immigrants-mariel.
28. See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 11 (noting that three Cuban-Americans
were elected to Congress and took an active role in the policy of the United
States towards Cuba).
29. See, e.g., Grogan, supra note 27.
30. A crude reference to the 1983 film Scarface, in which Al Pacino plays a
criminal arriving in the United States from Cuba during the Mariel crisis.
SCARFACE (Universal Studios 1983).
31. President Jimmy Carter, Remarks at a League of Nations Press
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policy toward Cuban migrants.32 Castro responded by opening
the Port of Mariel in Cuba, effectively permitting Cubans
desiring to leave the island to do so freely.33 One-hundred
twenty-five thousand Cubans took advantage of this opening
and fled from the port to the United States where many were, as
Carter intimated, welcomed with open arms.34 The exodus
became known as the “freedom flotilla.”35
Unlike in previous mass migrations, the majority of these
Mariel migrants were working-class citizens, many of AfroCuban descent.36 A smaller percentage were considered to be
social outcasts, criminals, and those previously institutionalized
for mental illness.37 The latter group was portrayed in the film,
Scarface, where Al Pacino played a former Cuban mobster who
came to the United States through the Mariel boatlift to build a
criminal enterprise in Miami.38

Conference (May 5, 1980).
32. See Hughes, supra note 24, at 56.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Michelle A. Satin, From Mariel into the Twenty-first Century: The
Indefinite Detention of Cuban Excludable Aliens in the United States, 22 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 139, 139 (1996).
36. Hughes, supra note 24, at 56–57.
37. Silvia Pedraza, Cuba’s Refugees: Manifold Migrations, 5 CUBA
TRANSITION 311, 318 (1995).
38. SCARFACE (Universal Studios 1983); see also Damarys Ocaña, Opinion,
An Unfortunate Icon, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2008, 3:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/dec/10/scarfaceal-pacino-anniversary-latinos (pointing to Scarface’s portrayal of Cuban
immigrants who arrived on the Mariel boatlift as a negative reinforcement of
stereotypes surrounding those immigrants).
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Castro closed the port of Mariel following an agreement with
the United States on October 31, 1980.39 Between the closing of
the port and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Cuban migration to the
United States remained stable and relatively low. However,
migration has recently trended to its highest levels since
Castro’s revolution (see Figure 1 below).40

Cuban Migration to the United States
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1960-1969

1970-1979

1980-1989

1990-1999

2000-2009

Figure 1. Periods of Cuban Migration to the United
States.
Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics.
III.

THE VEIL IS LIFTED

The Soviet-led communist empire collapsed when the Berlin
Wall fell in 1989. Countries that depended upon the Soviet
Union, including Cuba, saw a dramatic reduction in their

39. See, e.g., Andrew Glass, Castro Launches Mariel Boatlift, April 20,
1980, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2009, 4:19 AM), http://www.politico.com/story
/2009/04/castro-launches-mariel-boatlift-april-20-1980-021421 (“Washington
and Havana agreed the impromptu exodus would end Oct. 31, 1980.”).
40. See, e.g., Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 242.
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economic support.41 Similar to the Soviet Union, the veil was
lifted from an artificially sustained economy.42
Cuba’s economic conditions worsened quickly as the
government attempted to survive without the Soviet
apparatus.43 This economic crisis caused an increase in the
number of Cubans seeking refuge in the United States (see
Figure 1 above). One such effort of Cuban migrants fleeing the
island made headlines when the Cuban Coast Guard sunk the
migrants’ ferryboat, killing those onboard.44 This incident led to
mass protests in Cuba against the Castro regime.45 In response,
Castro announced that the Cuban government would no longer
block migrants from leaving the island.46
Following Castro’s announcement, 32,000 Cubans fled the
island, principally on the grounds of economic (rather than
political) need.47 Per the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans
admitted into the United States would be eligible to apply for
permanent resident status and, ultimately, citizenship. All they
had to do was reach the United States and claim asylum.48 The
United States government widely accepted Cuban migrants’
asylum claims in the face of communism and under President
Carter’s open-arms policy.49
The Cuban migrants in 1994, as noted above, were fleeing
not necessarily communism but the economic consequences of a
failed communist state. As exemplified in Figure 1, above, the
number of Cuban migrants steadily rose beginning in 1990,
following the end of the Cold War and the weakening of the

41. See, e.g., Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economic Effects on Cuba of the
Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, in CUBA AFTER THE
COLD WAR 133, 147 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993) (“Soviet economic aid to
Cuba assumed three forms between 1960 and 1991: credits to cover trade
deficits, development loans, and price subsidies . . . . In 1992 all aid ended.”).
42. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 242–43.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 243.
45. See id.
46. See Geoffrey W. Hymans, Outlawing the Use of Refugees as Tools of
Foreign Policy, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 149, 153 (1996).
47. See id.
48. See Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat.
1161 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994)).
49. See Art Pine, Cuba Refugees in U.S. Hold Special Immigration Status:
Citizenship: Those Fleeing Castro Are Unique in Being Guaranteed Entry.
Haitians, Whose Exodus Is Similar, Say They Are Victims of Discrimination,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-08-19/news/mn28796_1_immigrant-status.
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Cuban economy. Migrants fleeing dire economic circumstances
during this period could place themselves in the same boat as
other emigrants looking for a better life in America and, to an
extent, decouple themselves from the status of a refugee fleeing
communism.
Recognizing this evolving political climate and also desiring
to prevent another mass exodus, President Clinton sought to
stop the raft migrants, or balseros, from risking their lives
crossing ninety miles of dangerous sea. On August 19, 1994, just
over two weeks after Castro’s announcement that he would not
stop emigrants from leaving, President Clinton implemented a
deterrence policy.50 The new policy required the United States
Coast Guard to turn around Cuban boats on the open sea and to
transport them to Guantanamo Bay or to other refugee camps
for eventual repatriation to Cuba.51
Yet, the migrants kept coming.52 It became clear to both the
United States and Cuba that bilateral action was required to
stop the balsero crisis.53 On September 9, 1994, roughly a month
after the crisis was triggered, President Clinton and Fidel Castro
entered into the Cuban Migration Agreement.54 This agreement
required Castro to take measures to prevent Cubans from
departing in unsafe vessels. In exchange, the United States
promised to admit at least 20,000 Cubans legally each year.55
Note that this policy is the only immigration policy that sets a
floor rather than a ceiling on the admission of migrants from a
single country.56 During a speech the following year, Clinton
justified the policy:
We simply cannot admit all Cubans who seek to come
here. We cannot let people risk their lives on open seas
in unseaworthy rafts. . . . Regularizing Cuban migration
also helps our efforts to promote a peaceful transition to
democracy on the island. For too long, Castro has used
the threat of uncontrolled migration to distract us from
50. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/NSIAD-95-211, CUBA: U.S.
RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS 1 (1995).
51. See id.
52. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 243–44.
53. See U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique on Migration, 5 U.S. DEP’T ST.
DISPATCH 603, 603 (1994).
54. See id.
55. Joint Communique on Immigration Matters, Cuba-U.S., Dec. 14, 1984,
35 U.S.T. 6479.
56. Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 61 (1999).
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this fundamental objective. With the steps I have taken,
we are now able to devote ourselves fully to our real, longterm goal.57

Further complicating the new policy on Cuban migration,
President Clinton reversed the former United States policy
allowing the 21,000 balseros to be detained at Guantanamo Bay
pending repatriation to Cuba to be admitted as asylees.58
Cuban migrants who took their chances on the sea hoping
to land in the United States and be granted asylum according to
the Clinton Accord were met with resistance. Between May 2,
1995, and September 30, 1998, nearly 2,000 Cubans were
interdicted at sea and returned to Cuba.59 Cubans were expected
to follow traditional visa application procedures. However, those
who successfully landed in the United States were considered
“legally present” and could apply for asylum.60
Cuban migration throughout the first decade of the 21st
century remained steady at roughly 27,000 migrants per year.61
President Obama addressed United States-Cuba relations as
early as 2009, loosening restrictions on remittances and
expanding opportunities to travel to Cuba for educational and
scientific purposes.62 This was a significant break from the policy
of his predecessor, George W. Bush, who maintained the
economic embargo and focused on encouraging Cubans in Cuba
to push for democratic change from the inside, without any
significant outside change.63
57. President William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Cuban-American
Community (June 27, 1995).
58. See Clinton Administration Reverses Policy on Cubans, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 622, 622 (1995). See also Ann Devroy & Daniel
Williams, In Reversal, U.S. to Accept Cubans Held at Navy Base, WASH. POST
(May 3, 1995), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/03/inreversal-us-to-accept-cubans-held-at-navy-base/d793a7a3-bf06-4dea-94c7f87499fee902/.
59. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40566, CUBAN
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY AND TRENDS 9 (2009).
60. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1)
(1999).
61. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., 2014 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 10 (2016).
62. Danielle Renwick, Brianna Lee & James McBride, U.S.-Cuba
Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/cuba
/us-cuba-relations/p11113.
63. See, e.g., President Bush Outlines Cuban Policy Initiatives, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 24, 2007, 6:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb
/latin_america-july-dec07-cuba_10-24/ (quoting the President’s speech
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More dramatic changes began later in the Obama
administration. In 2014, President Obama announced the
restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States
and Cuba.64 In 2015, Cuba released fifty-three political prisoners
as a sign of good will and progress toward improved human
rights.65 Each country opened its embassy in Havana and
Washington later that same year.66 And capping this series of
executive actions, President Obama flew to Cuba—the first
United States President to do so since Calvin Coolidge—to meet
with Raúl Castro.67
The changes taking place today in United States-Cuba
policy are the most dramatic since the imposition of the
congressional embargo in 1996.68 The eventual termination of
the economic embargo will likely bring substantial
improvements to the Cuban economy. At the same time, there is
a significant possibility that softening relations between the
countries will result in a removal of Cuba’s special immigration
status.69 This has stirred fear among many Cubans who worry
that the door to the United States is closing. This fear is reflected
in the increase in Cuban migration since President Obama
began softening relations (see figure 2 below).
encouraging Cubans to initiate change).
64. Peter Baker, U.S. to Restore Full Relations with Cuba, Erasing a Last
Trace of Cold War Hostility, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/us-cuba-relations.html.
65. Matt Spetalnick, David Adams & Lesley Wroughton, Cuba Has Freed
All 53 Prisoners as Agreed in U.S. Deal: U.S. Officials, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2015,
5:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-prisoners-idUSKBN0KL
10K20150112.
66. Katherine Vargas, Embassy Openings in Washington and Havana: On
a Path Towards a Democratic, Prosperous Cuba, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 21,
2015,
6:00
AM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/07/21/embassyopenings-washington-and-havana-path-towards-democratic-prosperous-cuba.
67. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Randal C. Archibold, Obama Meets Raúl
Castro, Making History, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/04/12/world/americas/obama-cuba-summit-of-theamericas.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Frandal-c.archibold&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&modul
e=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=34&pgtype=collection.
68. See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 11, at 17 (highlighting the significance of
President Obama’s visit to Havana and the congressional embargo).
69. See, e.g., id. at 40 (“Without lifting the congressional embargo, U.S.
companies will continue to be excluded from the Cuban market and Cubans will
likewise have no access to the U.S. market.”); Susan Eckstein, Time to End
Special Privileges for Cuban Immigrants, REUTERS: THE GREAT DEBATE (Jan.
6, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/05/time-to-end-specialprivileges-for-cuban-immigrants/.

94

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

Cuban Migration to the United
States (2010-2014)
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Figure 2. Cuban Migration to the United States (2010–
2014).
Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics.
According to recent data from United States Customs and
Border Protection, the number of Cubans coming to the United
States has sharply increased in 2015 and 2016.70 This reflects
the rising concern among Cuban migrants that their window of
opportunity is going to close. To better understand what the
window has meant for the last fifty years, I will next examine
the Cuban Adjustment Act in detail.

70. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Surge in Cuban Immigration to U.S. Continues
into 2016, PEW RES. CTR. FACT TANK, http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/08/05/cuban-immigration-to-u-s-surges-as-relations-warm/
(last
updated Aug. 5, 2016).
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THE SPECIAL CASE FOR CUBAN MIGRANTS

A. THE CUBAN ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 196671
Prior to Castro seizing power in 1959, Cubans wishing to
enter the United States had to follow the same visa procedures
as immigrants from other countries.72 This meant applying for a
visa at the American Embassy in Havana and meeting the
criteria for a lawful immigrant. However, Castro’s new Cuba and
the termination of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the
United States led to a dramatic increase in the number of
Cubans wishing to depart for the United States.
A 1965 speech by President Johnson laid the context for
what would become the Cuban Adjustment Act the following
year:
I declare this afternoon to the people of Cuba that those
who seek refuge here in America will find it. The
dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for
the oppressed is going to be upheld. I have directed the
Departments of State and Justice and Health,
Education, and Welfare to immediately make all the
necessary arrangements to permit those in Cuba who
seek freedom to make an orderly entry into the United
States of America.73
As thousands of Cubans arrived in the United States
without a visa, they were “paroled” into the country on a
temporary basis while they sought legal admission. This meant
that they were allowed to enter the country but not provided
with any legal status yet. Under the immigration law at the
time, these paroled Cubans would have to leave the United
States and apply for a visa at a United States embassy in most
cases, to qualify for a legal admission.74 Doing so was very

71. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966).
72. Javier Talamo, The Cuban Adjustment Act: A Law Under Siege?, 8 ILSA
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 707, 708 (2002).
73. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the
Immigration Bill at Liberty Island, New York (Oct. 3, 1965) [hereinafter
Johnson’s Remarks].
74. Talamo, supra note 72, at 709; Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-648, sec. 10, 74 Stat. 504, 505 (1960) (prior to 1966 amendment).
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difficult.75 Accordingly, Congress passed legislation ensuring
special protection for Cuban migrants to save them from having
to apply for a visa.
The Cuban Adjustment Act was introduced by Senator
Edward Kennedy in 1966 and passed with overwhelmingly
bipartisan support, including a 300-25 vote in favor in the House
of Representatives and an unchallenged voice vote in the
Senate.76 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the act into law
in November 1966.77 The stated and largely supported purpose
for the Act was to incentivize the end of communism in Cuba and
protect those fleeing its grasp of communism.78
The Cuban Adjustment Act amended the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952 as follows:
[N]otwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, the status of any
alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States
subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically
present in the United States for at least two years, may
be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion
and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if
the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and
the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is
admissible to the United States for permanent
residence.79
In essence, the Cuban Adjustment Act creates a special
immigrant entry program just for Cubans whereby a Cuban
emigrant can avoid the strict requirements of the INA.80 Unlike
other immigrants, a Cuban does not have to enter the United
States legally at a port of entry. Unlike other immigrants, a
Cuban does not have to be lawfully present in the United States
prior to applying for permanent residence. And, unlike other

75. Talamo, supra note 72, at 709–10.
76. David Abraham, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: Past and Future
(University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-11, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642451&download=yes.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966).
80. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (1994).
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immigrants, a Cuban arriving anywhere in the United States
may receive the protections of an asylee without showing a wellfounded fear of persecution.81
The Cuban Adjustment Act allows any Cuban in the United
States, regardless of how they entered, to adjust their status to
legal permanent resident after two years of presence.82 Doing so
is the first step toward applying for citizenship and requesting
visas for family members. This is a unique and prized status for
migrants that affords Cubans privileges no other migrants
enjoy.83
The Cuban Adjustment Act became a beacon that Cubans
looking for a better life pursued, many to their peril. Likely the
most famous case relating to the Cuban Adjustment Act is that
of Elián Gonzalez, a six-year-old Cuban boy who was taken by
his mother, against the wishes of his father, to the United
States.84 The mother drowned en route to the United States but
Elián arrived safely.85 Given his age, Attorney General Janet
Reno placed Elián with relatives in Miami who sought to keep
him in the United States by petitioning on his behalf for asylum
under the Cuban Adjustment Act. The father in Cuba fought the
petition, claimed that only he could petition for his son, and
argued that Elián should be returned to him in Cuba.86 The
federal district court judge and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the father’s argument that only a parent could
petition for a child under the Cuban Adjustment Act.87 This led
to the widely-publicized forcible taking of Elián from his
relatives in Florida and his return to Cuba; an endeavor which
involved 130 immigration agents, many armed. Years later, as
an adult, Elián joined the Young Communist Party in Cuba and
told Fox News Latino that “[the Cuban Adjustment Act led to
the denial of] the right to be together with my father, the right

81. Abraham, supra note 76, at para. 3.
82. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161
(1966).
83. See, e.g., DIANNE E. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43888, CUBA SANCTIONS: LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS LIMITING THE
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS 2–3 (2015).
84. See A Chronology of the Elián Gonzalez Saga, FRONTLINE PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/elian/etc/eliancron.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2016).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000).
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to keep my nationality and to remain in my cultural context.”88
Following Fidel Castro’s death in 2016, Elián called Fidel a
father figure to him.89
The Gonzalez case highlights the controversial nature of the
Cuban Adjustment Act. While its goal appears to have been to
provide safe haven to Cuban migrants fleeing communism, it has
effectively turned into an open door policy allowing Cubans to
seek opportunity in the United States for any reason. It
incentivizes Cubans desperate for a better life to take their
chances at sea on their way to the United States. As political and
economic relations evolve between the United States and Cuba,
the Cuban Adjustment Act must also evolve to reflect the new
reality of Cuban migration.
B. THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION AGREEMENT
Migration from Cuba escalated into the early 1990s,
especially following dramatic speeches made by Fidel Castro
about United States imperialism and the migration crisis, which
he blamed on the United States’ policies toward migrants.90 By
1994, the number of Cuban migrants had climbed to 40,000 (see
Figure 1).91 This led the United States to negotiate with Cuba
over the establishment of a “safe, legal, and orderly” migration
process.92
The accord reached by President Clinton and Fidel Castro
applied a carrot and stick approach by which Cubans intercepted
at sea would no longer be brought to the United States to take
advantage of the Cuban Adjustment Act, but rather they would
be taken to Guantanamo Bay, a United States-controlled naval
base on the island of Cuba. Additionally, the United States

88. Elián González: My Time In The U.S. ‘Marked Me For My Whole Life’,
FOX NEWS LATINO (Nov. 19, 2013), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics
/2013/11/18/elian-gonzalez-my-time-in-us-marked-me-for-my-whole-life/.
89. Kristine Guerra, ‘Fidel was a Friend’: Elián González Remembers
Castro as a Father Figure, Wash. Post (Nov. 27, 2016).
90. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman & Linda Robinson, Castro in 1994: U.S.
Needs to Change ‘Old, Obsolete Policy’ Toward Cuba, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Dec. 17, 2014, 3:37 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/12/17
/castro-in-1994-us-needs-to-change-old-obsolete-policy-toward-cuba (explaining
that Castro said that the fact that more illegal than legal Cuban immigrants
were being accepted shows a flaw in U.S. immigration law).
91. RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supra note 83, at 2.
92. See id.
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offered a minimum of 20,000 visas to eligible Cuban migrants
each year.93
By May of 1995, 33,000 Cubans were detained at
Guantanamo Bay with questionable legal status—they could not
claim United States residency since they had never set foot on
United States soil but they also refused to return to Cuba.94
Ultimately, President Clinton decided to “parole” those Cubans
into the United States in an effort to meet the 20,000 minimum
quota set in the 1994 accord, which was a difficult target for the
United States to reach with qualified migrants. As part of a new
agreement between the heads of state in Cuba and the United
States, the United States agreed to stop taking Cuban migrants
to Guantanamo Bay and instead took Cubans interdicted at sea
back to Cuba. The new policy, which returned Cubans captured
at sea to Cuba and admitted Cubans who reach the United
States’ shores under the Cuban Adjustment Act, became known
as the “wet foot/dry foot” policy.95
The open arms policy of President Carter had largely
disappeared from the American public’s perception of Cuban
migrants by the late 1990s. Following the balsero exodus, antiimmigrant sentiment in the United States grew. Under
Republican Governor Pete Wilson, California enacted
Proposition 187 in 1994, also known as the “Save Our State
Initiative.”96 The law barred undocumented immigrants from
access to public services, including health and education. The
law passed by large margins and was challenged three days later
in federal court, where a federal judge struck it down as an
unconstitutional usurpation of federal power. Judge Mariana
Pfaelzer stated in her opinion that, “California is powerless to
enact its own legislative scheme to regulate immigration. It is
likewise powerless to enact its own legislative scheme to
regulate alien access to public benefits.”97

93. See Paul Lewis, Cuba Vows to End Exodus in Return for a Rise in Visas,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/10/world/cubavows-to-end-exodus-in-return-for-a-rise-in-visas.html.
94. See WASEM, supra note 59, at 3.
95. See id. at 4 (noting that the requirement to grant automatic asylum to
Cubans under the Cuban Adjustment Act at the time the migrant reaches dry
land, not U.S. territorial waters); see also Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1549
(3d Cir. 1995) (discussing that aliens must reach dry land to satisfy the
“physical presence” requirement).
96. See Prop. 187 Approved in California, MIGRATION NEWS (Dec. 1994),
https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=492.
97. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244,
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Following on the actions of California, Florida, which faced
the brunt of Cuban migration, initiated a lawsuit against the
federal government seeking reimbursement in the amount of
$1.5 billion for expenses associated with providing services for
unlawful immigrants.98 Florida lost the initial suit and the
appeal but claimed victory in drawing attention to the issue of
immigration policy and the need for reform.99 Even though the
suit was dismissed, Chiles, the Government of Florida, claimed
that the “lawsuit was successful in that it raised awareness of
the extraordinary impact of illegal immigration on border-states,
like Florida.”100
It is worth noting that in 1996 Congress enacted the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”) as an attempt at broad immigration reform under
President Bill Clinton.101 IIRIRA established many new
elements in the immigration law system, including employment
verification to prevent the hiring of immigrants without the
lawful right to work in the United States.102 As part of IIRIRA,
Congress included a provision that would terminate the benefits
of the Cuban Adjustment Act automatically once the President
certified to Congress that Cuba had successfully transitioned to
a democracy in accordance with the Helms-Burton Act.103
However, as discussed elsewhere, the likelihood of the President
invoking this provision is minimal as compared to the likelihood
of repealing the embargo on Cuba.104
Other attempts were made to repeal the Cuban Adjustment
Act in the midst of the growing American distaste for migrants
in the 1990s. But strong Cuban voices in politics helped to
overcome any such attempts. Consider, for example, that in
1261 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
98. Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334, 1335–36 (S.D. Fla. 1994),
aff’d 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995).
99. See, e.g., Megan O’Matz & Sally Kestin, Florida Politicians Protect
Special Status for Cubans, SUN SENTINEL (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.sunsentinel.com/us-cuba-welfare-benefits/sfl-us-cuba-welfare-benefits-part-3htmlstory.html (detailing the protections and benefits provided to Cuban
asylees).
100. See Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 245–46.
101. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (“IIRAIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996).
102. See id. § 401.
103. See id. § 606; see also Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms–Burton Act), Pub. L. 104–114, 110 Stat. 785, 22
U.S.C. §§ 6021–91.
104. See Fandl, supra note 11, at 39–40.
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February 1994, Democrat Michael Kopetski from Oregon
introduced legislation to repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act, but
the bill was not enacted.105 Later that same year, CubanAmerican and anti-Castro advocate Senator Robert Menendez
from New Jersey argued that Congress should modify the Cuban
Adjustment Act to prevent Cubans adjusting under the Act from
returning to Cuba prior to being naturalized as United States
citizens.106 As recently as March 2016, bipartisan legislation to
repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act was introduced in the House
of Representatives, though with little chance of passage.107
V. WHAT ARE CUBAN MIGRANTS FLEEING?
The Cuban Adjustment Act capitalized on the belief that
emigrants from Cuba would come to the United States to fight
the Castro regime, and communism generally, by draining the
Cuban economy of its best and brightest, and by taking positions
as Cuban-Americans against the regime. Prior to the Mariel Port
Crisis in the 1980s, this was largely the case. Cubans that came
to the United States tended to be white, educated, and often
wealthy.108 Those Cuban migrants left Cuba to protest the
Castro regime and to support anti-Castro movements in the
United States. Some of these migrants eventually entered
United States politics, pushing for more aggressive anti-Castro
policies, including the 1996 Helms-Burton Act.109
Beginning with the Mariel crisis, the typical Cuban coming
to the United States had changed. They were less often white,
educated or wealthy. They were, as scholar David Abraham
noted, “much more like other immigrants from poor Latin
countries”.110 Perhaps more importantly, these migrants were
less politically active, less opposed to the Castro regime, and
more interested in economic opportunity. This new migration
context changed the Cuban-American community from an antiCastro and largely Republican base to a pro-reform and
increasingly Democratic base. According to the Pew Research
105. See H.R. 3854, 103d Cong. (1994).
106. See 140 CONG. REC. 23,338 (1994).
107. See Correcting Unfair Benefits for Aliens Act of 2016, H.R. 4847, 114th
Cong. (2016).
108. Abraham, supra note 76, para. 6.
109. See generally Abraham, supra note 76 (describing Cuban migrants as
“extraordinarily well-situated exile leaders”).
110. Abraham, supra note 76, para. 6.
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Center, while 64% of Cuban-Americans identified as Republican
in 2002, only 47% did so in 2013.111
Cuban emigration shifted dramatically from political
refugees to economic refugees in the 1990s.112 The Anti-Castro
Cuban-American community has taken note of this shifting
dynamic. In 2013, Florida Senator Marco Rubio told reporters
that it is “very difficult to justify someone’s status as an exile
and refugee when a year and a half after they get here they are
flying back to that country over and over again.”113 High profile
Cuban-American politicians began calling for the repeal of the
Cuban Adjustment Act or at least modifications that prevented
Cubans who did not oppose the regime from taking advantage of
the law.114
While it may seem to some that fleeing a difficult economic
situation can be just as essential to a migrant as fleeing a
difficult political situation, economic circumstances will not
usually qualify a migrant for asylum or refugee status.115 Were
it the case that the economic environment in a country would
justify granting asylum to a migrant in the United States, we
would likely see a significant increase in the number of asylum
applicants from poor countries such as Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, or even Mexico. However, the Cuban Adjustment Act
has far less stringent requirements for granting arriving Cubans
admission than any other country, meaning that a Cuban fleeing
a poor economic environment could seek protection in the United
States.
According to the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans did not
have to show a fear of persecution since it was assumed that they
were fleeing a communist country for political reasons (even
111. Jens Manuel Krogstad, After Decades of GOP Support, Cubans Shifting
Toward the Democratic Party, PEW RES. CTR. FACT TANK (June 24, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/24/after-decades-of-gopsupport-cubans-shifting-toward-the-democratic-party/.
112. See generally Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 238–51 (explaining the
post-revolution immigration trends and policies).
113. Alex Leary, Sen. Marco Rubio Says He Wants to Re-Examine Cubans’
Fast-Track Status but Immigration Bill Doesn’t, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 25,
2013, 6:19 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/national/sen-marcorubio-says-he-wants-to-re-examine-cubans-fast-track-status-but/2128556.
114. See Abraham, supra note 76, para. 17 (“[O]ther old timers also suddenly
called for changes to the law.”).
115. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Falkler, Economic Mistreatment as Persecution in
Asylum Cases: Towards a Consistent Standard, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471, 483
(2007) (explaining that extreme economic hardship may in some cases qualify a
migrant for asylum but economic circumstances alone are usually insufficient).
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though the same would not hold true for migrants fleeing China
or Vietnam). “Congress in effect decided that because Cuba
under Castro was Communist, in general no Cuban should be
deported. The nationals of no other country have the same
screening exemption.”116
Perhaps no one is more outspoken against the continuation
of the Cuban Adjustment Act than Fidel Castro himself. Castro
called the Cuban Adjustment Act the “Killer Law” because it
encouraged Cubans to partake in a dangerous journey across the
sea to the United States with the expectation of a better life
while breaking apart families and Cuban society. He said:
The United States does not have any right to promote the
death of people from this country, whether they are
criminals or not. The diabolical killing machine that
claims lives and provokes tragedies is nothing other than
the Cuban Adjustment Act . . . .We will fight against this
vicious law, this heinous and criminal law. We will keep
fighting until it is repealed. Only then can we be certain
that thousands of innocent children will not be illegally
uprooted from their homeland, from their schools, from
their identities, and subjected to extreme dangers or
even death.117
VI.

ALIGNING CUBAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
WITH REALITY

The economic embargo the United States enacted against
Cuba in 1962 has come under significant criticism recently and
attitudes towards the embargo, in many ways, have softened.118
The arguments underlying the push to end the embargo are
quite similar to those underlying the push to end the Cuban
Adjustment Act. As the United States moves closer to
normalization of economic relations with Cuba, it must also end
the special immigration status Cubans have enjoyed since 1966.

116. Refugees,
FEDERATION
FOR
AM.
IMMIGR.
REFORM,
http://www.fairus.org/issue/Refugees (last updated Feb. 2003).
117. Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba, Remarks at the
Rally of Youth and Students Marking the Closing Session of the 7th Congress
of the Federation of Cuban Women (Mar. 8, 2000).
118. E.g., Renwick, Lee & McBride, supra note 62 (“Polls conducted shortly
after the U.S.-Cuba announcement in December 2014 found that a majority of
Americans supported reestablishing diplomatic ties.”).
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Communism posed an ideological threat to the liberal
democratic ideals of the United States throughout the Cold War.
Ideas about private property and resource management collided
in these two systems and created a seemingly incompatible
barrier to global relations. Citizens in a communist state could
not become consumers of foreign exports or participants in the
global economy, and therefore stymied the global economic goals
of a capitalist world, led by the United States. One of the systems
had to change for the world order to survive.
When the dust settled from the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989, the economic catastrophe of the Soviet Union was revealed
for the world to see.119 Weak oil prices, lack of trade, and
disincentivized production were largely to blame for the failed
economy.120 But the demise of the centerpiece of the communist
architecture signaled a win for the liberal economic approach of
the United States. Similarly, it motivated other countries with
models similar to the Soviet model to implement reforms.
Cuba shares its designation as a socialist state with three
other nations today—China, Vietnam and Laos. The communist
party has been in power in China since 1949, Cuba since 1966,
Vietnam since 1976, and Laos since 1975.121 Each of these four
socialist states began with austerity and strong state control and
each has since bent to the will of free markets and economics.
Vietnam was the first to open its door to free market
policies. The end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 left a
battered Vietnam with an economy in ruins. The Guardian
newspaper lamented:
The US left Vietnam in a state of physical ruin. Roads,
rail lines, bridges and canals were devastated by
bombing. Unexploded shells and landmines littered the
countryside, often underwater in the paddy fields where
peasants waded. Five million hectares of forest had been
119. See, e.g., Leon Aron, Everything You Think You Know About the
Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong, 187 FOREIGN POL’Y 64, 65 (2011)
(describing the economic instability in the USSR before its demise).
120. Id.
121. See Lao People’s Revolutionary Party - LPRP, U.S. LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://countrystudies.us/laos/85.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); The
People’s Republic of China, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://country
studies.us/china/24.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); Vietnam, U.S. LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://countrystudies.us/vietnam/51.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2016);
Communist Party of Cuba, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/Communist-Party-of-Cuba (last updated Apr. 20, 2011).
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stripped of life by high explosives and Agent Orange. The
new government reckoned that two-thirds of the villages
in the south had been destroyed. In Saigon, the American
legacy included packs of orphans roaming the streets and
a heroin epidemic. Nationally, the new government
estimated it was dealing with 10 million refugees; 1
million war widows; 880,000 orphans; 362,000 war
invalids; and 3 million unemployed people.122
Following the war, the United States enacted a trade
embargo on Vietnam, much like the present embargo on Cuba,
and influenced international agencies to limit their support of
the socialist government there.123 By the late 1980s, Vietnam’s
economy was barely breathing. The Vietnamese government
moved quickly toward a market-oriented socialist policy that
allowed private business, foreign investment, and free exchange.
By 1994, the United States lifted the trade embargo and allowed
money to flow back into Vietnam.124 In 2000, Vietnam began
privatizing its state-owned enterprises and by 2006, it had
acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO).125 The
government remains socialist, but is largely free-market
friendly.
Laos similarly struggled to survive after the Vietnam War,
which was significantly constrained within its neighbor’s
borders but often spilled over into its territory.126 At the same
time, it had been fighting its own civil war for independence
against the constitutional monarchy in place since 1953. The
King conceded power in 1975 to the Marxist government that led
the fight against the monarchy.127
From 1975–85, Laos functioned as a traditional socialist
government, with centralized social and economic policies.
However, lack of skilled laborers and challenging geographic

122. Nick Davies, Vietnam 40 Years On: How a Communist Victory Gave
Way to Capitalist Corruption, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 1:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/22/vietnam-40-years-on-howcommunist-victory-gave-way-to-capitalist-corruption.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Mai Der Vang, Heirs of the ‘Secret War’ in Laos, N.Y. TIMES (May
27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/opinion/heirs-of-the-secret-warin-laos.html?_r=0.
127. See Lao People’s Revolutionary Party - LPRP, supra note 121.
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circumstances limited the economic growth of Laos.128 In 1986,
the government, taking note of the success of Vietnam in doing
so, began adopting market-oriented economic reforms.129 Like
Vietnam, Laos privatized state-owned enterprises and opened
their doors to foreign investment. Also similar to Vietnam,
growth was strong following market-oriented reforms. Laos
joined the WTO in 2013.130
The elephant in the room is China—a major economic
powerhouse that still embraces socialist values. Mao Zedong
established the People’s Republic of China in 1949 with an
emphasis on socialist principles and rural economic
development.131 Differences of opinion between Mao’s approach
and the approach of Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union led
the two neighbors to part ways on communist ideologies during
the Cold War.132 Following Mao’s death in 1976, communist
party leader, Deng Xaoping, instituted Chinese economic
reforms and argued that a socialist country and a market
economy could coexist.133
The Chinese model of market socialism was largely based
on the idea that China would only be able to modernize if it
traded with the West. China began implementing laws allowing
foreign investment and foreign ownership as early as 1978,
beginning a period of rapid economic development and
growth.134 Today, China is growing rapidly and may soon
surpass the United States in terms of economic size.135 But, the
consumerist culture evident in the United States may not yet be

128. See Hatthachan Phimphanthavong, Economic Reform and Regional
Development of Laos, 3 MOD. ECON. 179, 179 (2012).
129. See id.; see also Henry Kamm, Communism in Laos: Poverty and a
Thriving Elite, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/30
/world/communism-in-laos-poverty-and-a-thriving-elite.html?pagewanted=all.
130. Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/lao_e.htm (last visited Nov.
7, 2016).
131. See The People’s Republic of China, supra note 121.
132. See W. Gary Vause, Perestroika and Market Socialism: The Effects of
Communism’s Slow Thaw on East-West Economic Relations, 9 NW. J. INT’L. L.
& BUS. 213, 222–23 (1988).
133. See id. at 223–24.
134. See id. at 224–26.
135. See, e.g., China Stumbles in Race to Pass U.S. as World’s Biggest
Economy,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Jan.
29,
2016,
11:33
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-29/china-stumbles-in-raceto-pass-u-s-as-world-s-biggest-economy (explaining that China has lost ground
since the U.S. recovery from the recession).
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fully reflected in the Chinese marketplace.136 Nevertheless, its
transition from an economically-struggling to an economicallythriving socialist state maintains the perception that a country
need not abandon socialist principles to achieve economic
growth.
Some have argued that China’s transition from a strong
communist country to a country centered on market-socialism
may be appealing to Cuba as it considers its next move.137 China
has not abandoned its socialist principles and yet has embraced
free markets as vigorously as the United States. This model
presents a viable mechanism for Cuba to stay true to its
revolutionary roots and yet build a sustainable future for
economic growth.
The changes taking place in the Cuban economic and
political structures, as well as those taking place in United
States foreign policy toward Cuba, are entwined with
immigration policy. Currently, Cuban immigrants in the United
States are treated as political exiles fleeing communism and
seeking protection from oppression.138 As Cuba transitions from
a rigid socialist state to a market-oriented socialist state like
China, the flight from communism argument dissipates rapidly.
These economic changes in Cuba must eventually lead to the
revocation of the Cuban Adjustment Act and the grouping of
Cuban migrants with other migrants. Removal of the Cuban
Adjustment Act and the lifting of the economic embargo are both
highly likely in the near future. The question is whether the
Cuban Adjustment Act will disappear before or after lifting the
economic embargo.
One of the conditions of the Helms-Burton Act to lift the
economic embargo on Cuba is the establishment of a transitional
government in Cuba.139 The policy statements underlying the
Act clearly refer to the desire to remove Castro from the Cuban
political system.140 Raúl Castro has already pledged to step down
136. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, China Not Yet Free Market, CATO INST.,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-not-yet-free-market (last
visited Nov. 7, 2016).
137. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the
Crossroads: Cuban Marxism, Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market
Globalism, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 342 (2004).
138. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161
(1966).
139. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22
U.S.C. §§ 6021–91, Pub. L. No. 104-114.
140. The Act mentions Castro 35 times. See id.
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from power in 2018.141 Upon relinquishing power, a younger and
more market-friendly party member is expected to take control.
The United States President may determine this to be a
transitional move.
The rationale underlying the application of the Cuban
Adjustment Act to Cuban migrants, which was originally to
protect Cubans fleeing Castro’s communist regime, would
diminish dramatically with a market-oriented socialist
government in place.142 In signing the Cuban Adjustment Act,
President Johnson said:
[I] declare this afternoon to the people of Cuba that those
who seek refuge here in America will find it. The
dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for
the oppressed is going to be upheld.
The lesson of our times is sharp and clear in this
movement of people from one land to another. Once
again, it stamps the mark of failure on a regime when
many of its citizens voluntarily choose to leave the land
of their birth for a more hopeful home in America. The
future holds little hope for any government where the
present holds no hope for the people.143
There would be little room left to distinguish a migrant
fleeing persecution in Cuba from one fleeing persecution in
China. An immigrant fleeing persecution in China must
demonstrate a well-founded fear in order to be considered for
refugee or asylee status in the United States.144 An immigrant
fleeing Cuba for any reason need only enter the United States
and apply to adjust his or her status to a lawful permanent
resident.145 Though the political conditions would be nearly
identical, the process for entering migrants would differ
141. See Damien Cave, Raúl Castro Says His New 5-Year Term as Cuba’s
President Will Be His Last, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/02/25/world/americas/raul-castro-to-step-down-as-cubas-president-in2018.html.
142. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161
(1966).
143. Johnson’s Remarks, supra note 73.
144. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2016).
145. See, e.g., Green Card for a Cuban Native or Citizen, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/other-ways-get-green-card
/green-card-cuban-native-or-citizen (last updated Mar. 22, 2011).
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dramatically if the Cuban Adjustment Act were to remain in
place.
Of course, dismantling the Cuban Adjustment Act would
mean closing the door to a pipeline of migrants from Cuba that
has been open for half a century. Improving economic relations
with Cuba have already begun signaling to the Cuban people
that the open door policies of the past may soon be coming to an
abrupt end, leading to substantial increases in the number of
Cubans fleeing to the United States.146 This surge in Cuban
migrants could be exacerbated further by shocks to the economy
in the face of rapid economic reforms on the island. “[T]here is a
significant risk of a mass exodus of Cubans to the United States
if economic conditions take a turn for the worse [in Cuba]: this
is a common occurrence in countries during the early phases of
their free-market transitions.”147 Given the importance of Cuba
in our history and in our immigration policy, it is critical that
United States policy take a holistic approach to prepare for a
new day in Cuba. I will address that recommendation in my
conclusion.
VII.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The coming storm of Cuban migrants may be unlike
anything seen before as Cubans face economic change, political
transition, and the threat of being tossed into the much more
rigid and limited immigration categories of their Latin American
neighbors. Congress must act quickly to get ahead of this crisis
by having a succession plan in place for a new United StatesCuba relationship. This should include a phase-out of the Cuban
Adjustment Act with predictable and transparent requirements,
an economic development plan that emphasizes a rebuilding of
the Cuban economic infrastructure, and a resumption of trade
relations that encourage joint ventures and investment in
Cuba’s growing private sector.
The normalization of relations between the United States
and Cuba has had positive effects on trade and investment, and
this has led to both new opportunities and new hope for an
improved Cuban economy.148 But, it has also stirred panic
among some Cubans that normalization will mean an end to
146. See Hymans, supra note 46; see also Krogstad, supra note 70.
147. Travieso-Díaz, supra note 1, at 236.
148. See Fandl, supra note 3, at 180.
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their special immigration benefits.149 The fear has grown to
significant levels, leading to a doubling in the number of rafters
encountered by the United States Coast Guard between
December 2013 and 2014 (see figure Figure 3, below).150 The
Coast Guard released an announcement directed at would-be
Cuban migrants reminding them that there have been no
changes to immigration policy—yet.151

149. E.g., Greg Allen, As Rumors Spread, More Cubans Try to Reach the U.S.
by Sea, NPR (Jan. 9, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015
/01/09/376094930/as-rumors-spread-more-cubans-try-to-reach-the-u-s-by-sea.
150. Id.
151. See Coast Guard Repatriates 121 Cuban Migrants Interdicted at Sea in
Past Week, U.S. COAST GUARD NEWSROOM (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.d7.uscg
news.com/go/doc/4007/2442054/.
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The United States embargo on Cuba today reflects a fixation
with Fidel and Raúl Castro and with a period of our history that
has largely disappeared from reality. Tying the lifting of the
embargo to the departure of the Castro family and the
replacement of a communist government with a democracy
belies the point that Cuba poses no threat—either as a
communist or a democratic state—to the United States or to the
world. Nevertheless, the language of the Helms-Burton Act
clearly ignores the possibility that a communist regime might
become a market economy without abandoning socialist
principles.152
Immigration policy toward Cuba, like economic policy, must
change. Cuba has already shown significant steps toward
market reforms that will allow a quicker pace for economic
growth on the island. Removal of the travel ban by the United
States and resumption of flights in 2016 will begin to boost
interest, investment, and ultimately, once regulations change a
bit more, tourism on the island. All of these developments create
an incentive to invest in Cuba for both Cubans and foreigners.
As the market economy continues to develop, United States
policy must focus on the Cuba of today—not the Cuba of the Cold
War era. This means implementing sensible economic policies
that facilitate sustained growth on the island after decades of
isolation, as well as encouragement for Cuban-Americans to
return to the island to facilitate its transition to a productive and
strategic regional partner. Phasing out the Cuban Adjustment
Act and removing the economic embargo are the first step in
achieving this goal.

152. See Rolando J. Santiago, Y2K, The Millennium for a Revised U.S.-Cuba
Trade Policy: Grounds for Removing the Embargo, 6 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM.
169, 170–71 (2000).

